Consistent with its theoretical horizon, based on the categories of totality and neces ¬ sity, Hegel believes that the task of philosophy is to acknowledge the reality and understand the rational structures that constitute it: "To understand what is is the task of philosophy, because what is the reason. " To tell the world as it should be, philosophy always comes too late, as reality comes when the com ¬ Pluto has its training process. It says a comparison with Hegel's famous, is like the owl of Minerva begins its flight at the break of dusk, that is when reality is already ready-made. Philosophy must therefore "keep peace with reality" and give up the absurd claim of determination and leadership. It should only take the form of thought, that develop into concepts, the actual content that the experience offers, demonstrations, and a reflection of the intrinsic rationality. This clear delineation The essential feature of Hegel's philosophy and personality. The real task which Hegel sought to give the philosophy. (And ¬ tried to achieve with its philosophy) is the rational justification of the reality, alive, the fact. This task he has tackled more vigorously pro ¬ priority when it appears more risky, that is against the political reality of state:
on law, ethics, truth is as old as the state, as known and openly exposed in public laws, public morals and religion. What needs further ¬ mind this truth, as the spirit of thinking is not content with owning so por ¬ tata hand, if you do not even understand it, and to capture the content already in itself a rational rational also, so it would seem justified to free thought?
that the philosophy of Hegel involves an attitude programmatically giustificazio ¬ nist to reality is evident from what has been said so far. The fact remains that Hegel, in order to avoid that his philosophy could be mistaken for a trivial accept ¬ tion of reality in all its aspects, even in the most immediate, has felt the need to point out:
"In ordinary life is called random fact every whim, error, evil and what is on this line, and any and all defective capricious existence. But even for the ordinary way of thinking accidental existence does not deserve the emphatic real name: - the accident is a life that has no more value than a possible, which may not be the same way that . But when I talked about reality, he would have had to think about the way in which I use this expression, since in my own extended logic [... ] I have carefully distinguished not only against accidental, which did exist, but also from being determined, and the existence of other concepts. "
According to some critics, this step would be to demonstrate as Hegelianism is not reducible to a form of justification. Indeed, if we consider the whole paragraph 6 of the Encyclopedia, you realize how Hegel, with its inter ¬ wind "defensive", he had no intention to repudiate the thesis of substantive rationality of reality, but only to exclude dall'accezione philosophical 'reality', the expecta ¬ ti "superficial" or "accidental` immediate existence. In fact, in the rest of the paragraph, Hegel, suggesting how the course or the texture of the world can never do without, in the essential aspects (ie, those that matter) to be necessarily rational, argues once again against "the separation idea of \u200b\u200breality 'and, finally, unequivocally concludes:
who does not possess the wisdom to discover, in what is around him, many things in fact are not as they ought to be? But this wisdom is wrong when he imagines Agios ¬ RARs, with such items and with their having to be in the circle of the philosophical interests of science. This has to do only with the idea, which is not as powerless to restrict to only have to be, and then actually not be: it has to do so with a reality of which those objects, institutions, etc. conditions. Are only and the outside surface.
A well-known strand of interpretation, ranging from Engels to Marcuse, while acknowledging aspects "¬ with conservatives" of Hegelian thought, however, has tried to show how it can be read even in a dynamic and revolutionary. According to those authors, Hegel's aphorism would, in essence, that the real is intended to coincide with the rational and the ir ¬ rational is bound to perish. Now that such a reading, rather than a "'interpretation" of Hegel, constitutes a sort of "correction" of its system in light of the revolutionary ideals of his nostrils ¬ champions is something that is not obvious from an examination of the ideological mind-affected of the above mentioned texts of the philosopher. So much so that it is able to give a semblance of legitimacy only historiographical pact distinguish Engels in German philosophical ¬ kr, the so-called method (classified as "revolutionary") from the so-called system (classified as "conservative"). Distinction that was later challenged by several parties and that, among other things, we do not find even in the young Marx, "for which there is no point talking ¬ king of contradiction between the method and system in Hegel, who indeed is the very method (ipostatiz-zante) Hegel to explain the findings of its reactionary philosophy "(G. Bedell). ¬ indefatigable you the young Marx (certainly not Hegel on this point, many of Engels and subsequent Marxists) has explicitly challenged the "canonization" or "sanctification" the existing operations by the Philosophy of Law. And if his way of relating to Hegel found after less than Engels, this is due to very specific historical and cultural circumstances (primarily to the fact that his philosophical writings were known much later) and certainly not to the lower validity his exegesis. In conclusion (it is good to stress this point even against the ambiguities and equiv ¬ there perpetuated by some manuals) it seems that the texts of Hegel, beyond any "construction ¬ tion" interpretation, documenting in a clear and unequivocal His attitude to fundamentally ¬ justificationism to reality.
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